Moving public-safety communications from narrowband systems such as TETRA to 4G and 5G is rarely a straightforward technology replacement. Coverage has to be at least as good as the system being replaced, resilience requirements are considerably higher than those of an ordinary commercial mobile service, and migration can take many years.
Iceland provides a particularly interesting example of how this transition might be approached.
A presentation at Critical Communications World 2026 outlined Iceland’s current thinking for its next-generation critical communications system. Rather than immediately building a completely separate nationwide 5G network or simply relying on ordinary commercial mobile services, the emerging model combines dedicated spectrum, a dedicated core and MCX capability, and shared hardened radio infrastructure.
The starting point is Iceland’s geography. The country covers around 103,000 square kilometres, around 75% of which is uninhabited highland and roughly 10% covered by glaciers. At the same time, approximately half of Iceland’s population lives in the capital region.
That creates an unusual communications challenge. A relatively small population of around 400,000 has to support critical communications over a very large area, including remote roads, mountains, coastal regions and sparsely populated interior areas. Iceland also has to contend with volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, extreme weather, floods, avalanches and other natural hazards.
Its current critical communications system is TETRA. The network began operation in 1999, initially covering around 20% of the country. A decision was taken in 2005 to extend it across most of Iceland, a process that took around ten years. The state-owned Motorola-based network now has approximately 220 base stations.
The user base is unusually broad. More than 12,000 TETRA terminals are currently in use, which the presentation says corresponds to around 3% of Iceland’s population and may be among the highest TETRA-terminal-per-capita figures in the world.
Users extend well beyond the traditional police, fire and ambulance community. They include the Coast Guard, customs, hospitals, public transport, road authorities, harbour services, aviation and airport services, municipal services, energy and heavy industry, private security, tourist services, banks, telecom operators and airlines.
This matters because replacing TETRA is therefore not simply about migrating a few emergency-service organisations. The communications system has effectively become part of Iceland’s broader critical infrastructure.
Nor is TETRA about to disappear.
The CCW presentation says that it could remain operational for up to another ten years. Motorola support is covered by an “Evergreen” arrangement until the end of 2032, while usage continues to increase in both user numbers and traffic. Terminals are still being upgraded, the network is being expanded and additional service functions are being developed.
This is an important point that is sometimes lost in discussions about mission-critical broadband. The arrival of MCX over 4G or 5G does not automatically mean that TETRA can be switched off. A broadband network first has to prove that it can deliver the necessary coverage, availability, resilience, operational procedures, devices and mission-critical functionality.
Iceland is therefore planning a lengthy period in which TETRA and next-generation services coexist. The timeline shown at CCW is explicitly described as still to be decided, but envisages preparation, a proof of concept, network design, procurement and construction before an initial limited next-generation service. Full nationwide service would come later, with TETRA continuing alongside the new network during the transition.
The spectrum strategy is one of the most interesting parts of the programme.
Iceland has already secured 2×10 MHz of 700 MHz spectrum for public-safety communications. The CCW presentation says that use of this spectrum comes with obligations relating to sharing with mobile operators.
Low-band spectrum such as 700 MHz is particularly valuable for a country like Iceland. Lower frequencies generally provide greater geographical coverage per radio site and better penetration than mid-band spectrum. That does not remove the need for extensive infrastructure, particularly in Iceland’s difficult terrain, but it makes 700 MHz a logical foundation for wide-area critical communications.
There is also an important spectrum-sharing dimension.
Earlier regulatory work in Iceland deliberately preserved the possibility that public-safety spectrum could coexist with commercial usage rather than necessarily remaining unused whenever emergency services did not require all available capacity. The emerging architecture appears to continue that philosophy: maintain control over spectrum needed for public safety while investigating whether commercial infrastructure and capacity can be shared safely.
The CCW presentation describes the likely national architecture quite succinctly:
Own core + own MCX + shared hardened RAN using the public-safety spectrum.
That is potentially a very pragmatic compromise.
A fully dedicated national mobile network would provide considerable control but would also require Iceland to fund, build and operate a separate radio network over a geographically challenging country with a very small population.
At the opposite extreme, simply purchasing standard commercial mobile services would make much greater use of existing infrastructure but could leave too many questions around resilience, capacity, priority, security and operational control.
The proposed model potentially separates those issues.
A dedicated core gives the public-safety service greater control over subscriber management, policy, security and service behaviour. A dedicated MCX environment provides the mission-critical application layer for services such as Mission Critical Push-to-Talk, Mission Critical Video and Mission Critical Data.
The radio layer, however, could make greater use of infrastructure shared with commercial operators.
Precisely what Iceland means by a “shared hardened RAN” has not yet been made public. The presentation does not specify whether the eventual arrangement would use MOCN, MORAN, roaming or another network-sharing architecture, and it would be premature to assume a particular implementation.
“Hardened” is equally important. A radio site suitable for mission-critical communications may require substantially greater resilience than a normal commercial site, including backup power, diverse transmission, protection against environmental risks, appropriate security and the ability to continue operating during major incidents.
This architecture becomes even more interesting when combined with another development that has emerged since the CCW material was prepared: network slicing.
In a 2026 spectrum and innovation consultation, NeyðarlÃnan and Öryggisfjarskipti told Icelandic regulator Fjarskiptastofa that several approaches could be used to build an economically viable next-generation emergency communications system in a sparsely populated country. They suggested that one of the most sensible options could be network slicing, with part of a mobile network permanently, or dynamically when required, reserved for public safety. The radio component of that slice could use spectrum specifically reserved for emergency and security communications.
This should not be interpreted as network slicing magically creating a mission-critical network.
A real end-to-end network slice involves much more than configuring something in the 5G core. As the same consultation notes, slicing requires coordination across the RAN, transport network and 5G Standalone core, together with end-to-end control and orchestration.
Iceland’s operators are also at different stages of readiness.
Nova said that it had evaluated and tested slicing and considered the technology mature enough to move towards the next steps. SÃminn said it was developing a 5G core supporting 5G Standalone and slicing, expecting 5G SA around 2026/27, with slicing potentially following where there is customer demand. Sýn said it was installing a 5G SA core that would support network slicing and that its 5G radio network was capable of supporting such capabilities.
Fjarskiptastofa was more cautious. It noted that the operators are at different stages of 5G SA deployment and that building all the necessary technical components will take time. It therefore remains uncertain exactly when commercial network slicing will become widely available in Iceland and whether emergency communications will be among its first applications.
This uncertainty helps explain another sensible part of Iceland’s strategy: test before committing to the final national architecture.
The next step outlined at CCW is a proof of concept covering the ReykjavÃk capital area.
Instead of immediately purchasing all the components that might eventually form the national system, the PoC is expected to use a leased core, leased RAN operating Iceland’s allocated public-safety spectrum, and leased MCX platform. Device management arrangements were still to be decided when the presentation was prepared.
The proposed trial would run for around six to twelve months.
Its objectives go well beyond checking whether MCPTT calls work. The intention is to allow the future service operator to learn how the system behaves, understand costs and network architecture, obtain user feedback, develop device acceptance procedures, explore the use of 3GPP technology and shared RAN for critical communications, and ultimately determine the right network model for Iceland.
This is probably one of the more important lessons from the Icelandic programme.
The exact division between dedicated and shared infrastructure is not being treated as something that can be decided purely on a drawing. Running a real network using the intended spectrum, devices, MCX platform and user organisations should expose operational issues that are difficult to understand from specifications alone.
There is also an interesting development around 3.4 GHz spectrum.
The CCW slide mentions the possible use of “2×100 MHz” around 3.4 GHz for higher-bandwidth requirements. However, subsequent regulatory material provides a more precise picture.
Fjarskiptastofa identifies the available block as 3400–3500 MHz, a contiguous 100 MHz block, and notes that the wider 3400–3800 MHz range is harmonised for 5G. The regulator says that 80–100 MHz assignments are generally desirable in this range to obtain the necessary capacity and efficiency from 5G systems.
This is TDD spectrum, so describing it as 2×100 MHz would be misleading from a conventional FDD perspective.
NeyðarlÃnan and Öryggisfjarskipti argued that the 3400–3500 MHz block is technically well suited to the long-term data requirements of responders and asked that it be reserved for emergency and security communications. They also suggested that, during emergencies, it might potentially support limited public use.
Fjarskiptastofa accepted the basic argument and said it intends to consult on assigning the spectrum to emergency and security communications under conditions comparable to those associated with the existing 700 MHz authorisation.
The two bands would perform very different jobs.
700 MHz is well suited to creating a wide-area coverage layer.
3.4 GHz with 100 MHz of contiguous spectrum can provide substantially greater capacity in locations where high data rates are required, but its coverage characteristics mean it would not be an economic replacement for 700 MHz across Iceland’s remote areas.
This creates the possibility of a layered network in which low-band spectrum provides the basic mission-critical footprint while mid-band capacity is deployed selectively in cities, operational centres, airports, ports, incident locations or other areas where video and high-bandwidth applications become important.
Fjarskiptastofa’s wider consultation also points towards an increasingly multi-layered view of resilience. Responses discussed secure next-generation terrestrial communications alongside satellite connectivity, including 3GPP NTN technologies, as a way of maintaining geographical coverage and connectivity to critical infrastructure without relying exclusively on terrestrial networks.
That does not mean satellite is about to replace terrestrial mission-critical communications. Capacity, device support, latency, indoor availability and operational characteristics remain different. It does, however, reinforce the broader principle that future public-safety communications are unlikely to depend on one network or one technology alone.
There has also been a significant organisational development since the CCW presentation.
On 14 August 2026, Farice announced the formation of Korda Networks, which will formally begin operations on 1 September. The new state-owned company brings together Farice, the critical communications technical operations of NeyðarlÃnan and Öryggisfjarskipti, which will continue as a Korda subsidiary.
Korda will operate infrastructure including Iceland’s international submarine cable connectivity, the TETRA critical communications network, technical systems supporting emergency services and a satellite backup route for international communications. The stated objective is to strengthen operational resilience, cyber and information security, and the ability of critical infrastructure to withstand natural hazards, cyber threats and other operational risks.
It is too early to say whether the creation of Korda will change the technical design of Iceland’s next-generation public-safety network. It does, however, place the programme in a wider strategic context. Iceland is not considering mission-critical broadband in isolation; it is consolidating responsibility for several pieces of nationally important communications infrastructure around resilience.
There is one further reality check.
This programme has already encountered delays associated with funding. Fjarskiptastofa previously noted that funding had not been secured for parts of Öryggisfjarskipti’s planned infrastructure and future emergency communications network, making some of the original obligations associated with the 700 MHz authorisation impossible to meet on the original timetable. The regulator therefore proposed relaxing those deadlines while retaining the spectrum for the future public-safety system.
That makes the incremental approach now being described even more understandable.
Iceland is not pretending that moving from a mature TETRA system to nationwide mission-critical broadband can happen quickly. Instead, the emerging strategy appears to be:
keep improving TETRA → test 3GPP mission-critical broadband → use dedicated 700 MHz spectrum for coverage → investigate 3.4 GHz for capacity → retain control of the core and MCX → explore sharing a hardened RAN → use network slicing where it genuinely adds value → migrate users gradually once the new system has proved itself.
It is a much more pragmatic picture of the TETRA-to-broadband transition than the simple idea of replacing one radio technology with another.
Perhaps the most interesting question now is not whether Iceland will use 5G for critical communications. That direction is increasingly clear.
The real question is which parts of a national mission-critical network genuinely need to be dedicated, and which can safely and economically be shared.
For a country with Iceland’s geography, population and resilience requirements, finding the right answer to that question may ultimately be more important than the choice of radio technology itself.
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